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Much like the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) introduced into
many national governments in the 1960s and 1970s, today’s planning-to-resourcing
systems have returned to focus on systems or capabilities. This article provides an
overview of the steps required to define and implement a defense planning-to-
resourcing system with a focus on systems or capabilities. Research on defense planning
shows that defense planners continuously strive to “improve” by alternating their
planning focus among capabilities, systems and functions, where the building block of
defense is viewed as capabilities, systems or functions, respectively.
Budgeters, by trade, legislation and expectation remain focused on inputs
purchased.The difficulty with linking plans to resources lies in the details: the explicit
connections between planning and budgeting to ensure that defense allocates resources
according to the choices and preferences made in the planning stage. This article
returns to the dilemma faced for at least 50 years: can defense link the choices of
planners, via program budgets, to resource allocation decisions? This article describes
one method to support the choices of decision-makers from desired capabilities
through to budgets and back.While the focus is on planning based on capabilities, the
discussion applies to other defense planning and resourcing systems.
INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest difficulties in defense planning and resourcing is bridging the divide
between planners who develop a joint strategy for the current and future capabilities of
the armed forces, and the budgeters who must translate this plan into actual inputs
purchased. These two groups can work closely with one another or can be legally
mandated to be separate, strictly independent entities such as in Germany.1 No matter
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the perceived distance of these groups, the central issue of connecting the choices of
planners to actual resource allocation remains. The difficulty with mapping plans to
resources lies in the details: the explicit connections between planning and budgeting to
ensure that defense allocates resources according to the choices and preferences made
in the planning stage. As was the case at the inception of the Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System in the 1960s, to make resource allocation tradeoffs requires con-
necting planning and budgeting.
Program budgeting offered perhaps the earliest solution to this dilemma. A program
budget, described in more detail below in Step 3, functions by general rules. It provides
the link between plans and budgets through a program structure, showing explicit con-
nections from policy objectives to the amounts budgeted to force units and weapons
systems to achieve them. Program budgets can vary widely to suit the needs of the
planning-to-resourcing system, and this latitude has caused much confusion. When
policy objectives change, military plans change and programs must reflect these
changes; otherwise, the vital link between policy objectives – desired outputs and
outcomes – and the funded force units or systems used to meet the objectives will be
misaligned.The authors’ experience suggests that in many countries and organizations,
misalignment between planned capabilities and budget systems results in the inability
to connect plans to resources.This article details one possible method to support the
choices of decision makers from desired capabilities through to budgets and back, high-
lighting the importance of systems thinking.
BACKGROUND
Since the 1960s, the planning focus of military resource allocation has alternated
among capabilities, systems and functions where planners view the building block of
defense as capabilities, systems and functions, respectively. Many Ministries or Depart-
ments of Defense continue to shift the orientation of their planning and resourcing
systems from service-driven demands for weapons and platforms to the top-down
determination of capabilities to meet a range of probabilistically determined threats.
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, NATO, EU organizations
(such as the Military Staff of the European Union and the European Defence Agency)
and countries of the EU, among others, employ Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP) to
improve the linkages among alliance or national goals, strategic plans, military capabil-
ities, and the allocation of defense resources. While the term “capabilities-based
planning” seems to be out of fashion in the US, defense leaders clearly believe planning
and executing strategy require the formulation of needed capabilities. The recently
released 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review “advances two clear objectives”:
First, to further rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in
today’s wars, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats.
Second, to further reform the Department’s institutions and processes to better
support the urgent needs of the war fighter; buy weapons that are usable, afford-
able, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and
responsibly.2
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While many documents and articles discuss the planning required by CBP or to
advance capabilities, few leaders give clear and explicit directions on the implementa-
tion of CBP and budgets. Partly this is due to the confusion that still surrounds CBP.
No one has properly defined CBP and the debate about what the term means
continues. Fitzsimmons summarizes the dilemma:
[. . .] it is remarkable that no official definition of the concept exists. But there are
probably as many definitions in the Pentagon as there are phone numbers, and
debate continues over just what the concept is, as well as whether it is appropriate
or even feasible as a framework for defense planning and decision making.The
persistence of these debates raises a fundamental question:What is CBP?3
In the authors’ opinion, Fitzsimmons also provides the best answer, highlighting the
need for a full management system. CBP “. . . should be an effective investment strategy
that develops and sustains4 the capability priorities identified through the planning
exercise.”5 Using this answer and the DoD’s definition of capability – the ability to execute
a specified course of action6 – this article suggests a method for successfully incorporating
CBP in a defense (or other government organization) resource allocation process.7
WHY PLAN BASED ON CAPABILITIES?
CBP, or any planning system based on identifying needed security capabilities, offers
several benefits; it focuses leaders of a defense organization on what the organization
needs to accomplish instead of the platforms and systems owned or in need of replace-
ment. Systems and platforms provide value only when used – what they do in times of
need. Therefore, CBP aims to delay decisions on specific systems by first allowing
planners to consider needed capabilities and then encouraging the development of
more innovative alternatives. This process helps leaders overcome the tendency to
replace platforms and equipment with the latest models of each. CBP also aims to
broaden the range of missions for which forces are prepared, facilitating analysis of a
great number of scenarios and future conditions.
Additionally, CBP makes the joint perspective predominant in all planning and pro-
gramming activities, forcing the services to suggest alternative ways to meet capability
needs and allowing DoD planners to choose among the alternatives. Finally, CBP
assists planners by using risk as a strategic measure of effectiveness, helping them
determine their exposure to unwanted outcomes.8 While ultimately CBP leads to
choices among systems and platforms to provide capabilities, it attempts to move
planners away from suggesting solutions too early in the planning process.
IN IMPLEMENTING CBP: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND
SCENARIO SELECTION
CBP begins with strategic plans. An organization’s leaders must first analyze the
context of possible future environments in which the organization may be required to
operate. Combining stated political guidance on strategic goals and objectives and
LINKING DEFENSE PLANNING AND RESOURCE DECISIONS • 389
26.4 Master.qxp:D&SA  12/11/10  10:39  Page 389
390 • NATALIE J. WEBB, ANKE RICHTER AND DONALD BONSPER
examining likely future conditions, leaders can begin to identify and address important
strategic issues. Multiple methods of thinking about what the organization “should” do
abound; Bryson notes,
To respond effectively to changes in their environments, public and nonprofit
organizations [. . .] must understand the external and internal contexts within
which they find themselves so that they can develop effective strategies [. . .]9
Context gives leaders the information they need to build scenarios with a sufficiently
broad view of possible future environments. Bryson recommends developing the
context using a SWOC analysis, which identifies and assesses Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities and Challenges facing the organization.10 The SWOC helps leaders
create plans that shape and guide the organization, providing information on today’s
capabilities and the decisions and actions necessary to change or update those capabil-
ities. Bryson also notes that,
[. . .] any effective response to potential challenges or opportunities must be based
on an intimate knowledge of the organization’s capabilities and the strengths and
weaknesses they entail. Strategic planning, in other words, is concerned with
finding the best or most advantageous fit between an organization and its environ-
ment based on an intimate understanding of both.11
The recommendation then, is that DoD planners involve groups of capability devel-
opers to help build scenarios that acknowledge and reflect uncertainty.12 The authors
also recommend they take the far harder path: to imagine major shifts in the geo-
political landscape rather than small changes to the status quo. History has repeatedly
shown that we need to expect the unexpected and to imagine a future very different
from the current state. Consider, for example, planning for a fifteen-year time horizon
at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1900, would defense agencies have been
able to predict the world reality as of 1915, in 1915, the reality of 1930, in 1930, the
reality of 1945, and in 1945, the reality of 1960? Predicting such “tectonic shifts” in
world landscape is nearly impossible: How do you tell a realistic future from science
fiction? Or when can you expect what you think of as science fiction to become real?
While this article offers no concrete answers to these questions, it reminds planners that
the goal of strategic planning is to confront – rather than discount – uncertainty and to
consider possible events and outcomes across a wide variety of futures.
To confront multiple possible futures, CBP prescribes that planners use different
scenarios, starting with an assumed baseline scenario.Typical baseline scenarios reflect
six dimensions:
• the political military context, e.g. how the situation came about, who is allied with
whom, the degree of strategic warning, forward stationing of forces, etc.;
• the objectives and strategies of all involved;
• the forces, such as size, character, nominal capabilities;
• force effectiveness, accounting for cohesion, morale, etc. of all involved forces;
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• the natural environment; and
• other assumptions.
For example, suppose military planners consider a scenario where an ally asks their
country to intervene in a regional war between two small neighboring countries. An
extremely simplified example of a baseline scenario for this possible future could be:
• Political military context – Countries A and B have had an on-going border
dispute for over 200 years with flare-ups approximately every 25 years, but as the
value of mineral deposits in the border region increases, the conflicts become
more frequent as both sides claim the deposits. Countries A and B are each allied
with larger Countries C and D, respectively, that have had a history of conflict as
well.Your country is viewed as relatively neutral.
• Objectives and strategies – Countries A and B wish to have the glory of claiming
victory in the historical dispute and gaining the riches from selling the mineral
deposits. Countries C and D wish to maintain a strong level of influence in their
respective allied countries and gain sole access to the minerals mined in the
disputed territory.Your country wishes to ensure that war does not spread from
these minor regional flare-ups.
• Forces – Countries A and B have low-technology armed forces, with primarily
infantry and light tank brigades. Countries C and D have high-technology armed
forces with extensive air forces and offensive firepower. Your country has a
modern but small force, generally designed for defense of the homeland.
• Force effectiveness – Countries A and B have extremely cohesive, nationalistic
forces. They perceive they are fighting for their honor and are not open to any
foreign intervention (pro or con). Lack of modern technologies hinders their
effectiveness. Countries C and D have forces equipped with the best technology
available, but the forces are not very cohesive due to infighting among the
different military branches and a mixed reaction to intervening in foreign
countries for monetary gain. Your country has very cohesive forces but the
country is small, the political sentiment is somewhat isolationist, and you have
great hesitancy to intervene in another country’s business.
• Environment – The region has a temperate but moist climate and several infec-
tious diseases are still prevalent, which have been successfully eradicated in your
country.
• Other assumptions –You expect the worth of the mineral deposits to increase 100-
fold due to a mounting world shortage.
Planners then look for likely variations from the baseline scenario and consider the
security consequences (e.g., what if mineral prices only increase ten-fold?). Next, they
look for unlikely variations from the baseline that could have serious consequences
(e.g., what if Country C instigates war to gain immediate mineral access and subsume
its allied country?). Planners choose a set of scenarios they deem to be of high risk or
extensive negative consequence, where risk is defined using three points:What can go
wrong?What is the likelihood that it happens? And what are the consequences if it does?
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Perhaps more so in the security environment than other settings, planners must
consider “Black Swan Events” – high-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare events beyond
the realm of “normal” expectations.13 Using their assessment of risk and consequences,
leaders then choose a subset of scenarios for in-depth study, leading to further consid-
erations of perceptions of risk, politics, and the ability to cover a broad spectrum of
situations.
DEVELOP CAPABILITY TREES OR HIERARCHIES
Once planners agree on a set of scenarios, they use the scenarios to identify “. . . the
complete set of capabilities considered necessary to meet the quantitative and qualita-
tive ambitions set out in the political guidance for defense planning through a
structured, comprehensive, transparent and traceable process . . .”14 Capability trees
provide a useful approach to continue to develop capability needs for each of the
scenarios. A capability hierarchy, or tree, visually represents the elemental capabilities
required to address the scenario. The hierarchy starts with general descriptions of a
capability then refines each level, illustrating smaller and more precise capabilities
needed to produce the more general capability. It uses an “and” logic.The base of the
hierarchy shows elemental capabilities needed to address the scenario.
For example, imagine the following scenario. A small country experiences a civil war
and its government appeals to international organizations for help in stabilizing the
country. Using knowledge of stability operations, planners in a country or alliance orga-
nization begin to define exactly what they mean by “stability operations”; that is, they
use a hierarchy to determine the elemental capabilities needed to provide stability oper-
ations. As Figure 1 illustrates, each level of the hierarchy further refines capabilities.
Figure 1: Example of a capabilities hierarchy for stability operations
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The top level of the hierarchy simply states the desired capability of stability opera-
tions. On the second level, planners define four essential capabilities for providing
stability ops: “Establish civil control;” “Establish civil security;” “Restore essential
services” and “Support governance.” To define “Establish civil security,” planners
define four more capabilities. Using the “and” logic, they work down the hierarchy until
the point where the discussion of how to provide a capability becomes a discussion of
alternative forces or weapons.When planners begin to use an “or” structure, they are
talking about alternatives and should go back up a level.
In the case of “Detain suspect,” planners could consider different force units to
provide the capability, e.g., military police, special forces or a regular army unit.
Because they use an “or” logic, the planners recognize these alternatives provide the
means to deliver the capability.Therefore, the elemental capability is “Detain suspect,”
the lowest possible level on this branch of the hierarchy. Planners must define elemental
capabilities so they can match them with existing and future weapons or units.
The most common pitfall with this approach is that organizations go too far down
the hierarchy, to the point of specifying alternative forces or weapons, such as special
forces. Planners must develop capability hierarchies to a level where they can identify
possible units (systems) able to deliver a capability but not to a point where they specify
only one system. Constructing a hierarchy differs from military operations planning – if
planners forget this, their choices for delivery of capabilities will be affected by their own
backgrounds.Armored division officers tend to require tanks and air force officers tend
to require aircraft, etc. Planners must recognize the elementary capability level and stop
their analysis before the choices of alternatives begins.
Recognizing that construction of hierarchies is an art, not an exact science, planners
must agree to move ahead with a “good enough” hierarchy for each scenario. Once they
agree on a capability hierarchy for each scenario, they can begin to see elemental capa-
bilities that address multiple or all scenarios. Planners then aggregate across scenarios
to determine defense’s collective need for an elemental capability.
To help determine collective need for a capability for the organization as a whole,
planners consider the relative importance and likelihood of each scenario and the stated
level of effort or national goals (or coalition or alliance goals), then agree on the relative
importance of capabilities. Planners also determine whether the capability is likely to be
needed sequentially or concurrently in the hierarchies and in the scenarios. In the end,
a country and its defense planners provide a master list of elemental capabilities across
scenarios, showing the conditions under which concurrent use of capabilities may
occur.This estimation requires much subjective assessment on how best to combine the
“quantitative” amounts of an elemental capability derived from the capability hierar-
chies. No “one size fits all” or best aggregation method exists.
FROM CAPABILITIES TO BUDGETS: PROGRAM
BUDGETING AND THE PROGRAM STRUCTURE
Once planners list desired capabilities and the quantities needed concurrently, they
begin to determine where gaps exist relative to the current force structure. Master capa-
bility lists reveal gaps in (or “excess”) capability, but do not address funding of the
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actual forces and weapons systems used to fill the gaps and provide capabilities.
Planning systems such as CBP do not provide a framework for connecting to a
resources management system. Translating desired outcomes or capabilities into
outputs using capabilities hierarchies or trees does not directly lead to a budget listing
inputs required. Traditional legal budgeting generally requires allocation along such
lines. Decision-makers need a framework in which to analyze alternative weapons and
forces, their costs and their substitutability or complementarity.
Thus to implement CBP (or any planning system) requires organizations to explic-
itly link inputs (budgets) to outputs thought to reflect the choices and preferences made
during the planning process (capabilities).As Novick, Schick and others note, decision-
makers have used the framework of program budgets to direct their focus to planning,
allowing assessment of strategies and the efficiency of public expenditures in achieving
goals.15 Bourdeaux notes that
research [. . .] and the general literature suggests [sic] building a program structure
that aligns resources with strategic plans and ties services or products to
outcomes, objectives, goals and mission.16
Program budgeting through the program structure provides a two-way flow of infor-
mation from threats or challenges to national interests, to policies and strategies to
respond to the threats, to capabilities needed to implement strategies, to forces or
weapons systems needed to provide capabilities, to budgets and back again:
National interests ↔Threat ↔ Policy/Strategy ↔Capabilities ↔ Forces ↔ Budget
Planners can link strategic plans to a resources management system if they translate
desired goals and objectives into outputs (force units and weapons systems) then
list them in a program structure. To facilitate a comparative evaluation of different
activities in relation to each other and in relation to their relative costs, resource
decision-makers employ a program structure to connect inputs to outputs.
The program structure classifies – for budgeting purposes – outputs relative to purpose
by major policy, function served, capability desired, geographical area or other mean-
ingful defense or security construct. Resource decision-makers classify the outputs,
called major programs, in relation to major activities or strategies that help an agency
achieve its goals.17 More specifically, Bourdeaux states that programs:
[. . .] Can be defined based on long-term, intermediate, or short-term outcomes
(and their associated products and services). Programs can also center around
customers served, populations served, geographic service areas, or organization
arrangements.18 (p. 24)
Figure 2 shows the bridge that the program structure provides between planning,
resourcing and resource allocation tradeoffs.
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Figure 2: Using a Program Structure to Connect Capabilities to Budgets
To make tighter connections between capabilities desired to achieve strategic goals
and the resources to fund them, the authors recommend that resource decision-makers
use major capability areas as programs in the program structure. Major programs based
on major capability areas such as direct combat, intelligence and reconnaissance,
command and control, protection, deployability, stability operations and information
superiority, more closely link capability-based plans to resources. For resources man-
agement purposes, the authors’ experiences suggest that the greater the difference
between capabilities desired and major programs, the more difficult it is to connect
budgets to outputs and outcomes.
To illustrate a capability-based program structure, consider the “Detain suspect”
elemental capability from the Stability Ops example, above. Stability Operations could
be a major program in the program structure. Note that the program structure corre-
sponds to a program budget; thus, defense uses it for resourcing purposes rather than
organizational, operational or other purposes. At the next level, decision-makers can
organize functional or capability related sub-programs – again for resourcing purposes
– to support stability operations.An example might be “Cessation of hostilities.” Under
this sub-program, decision-makers list program elements that support “Cessation of
hostilities.” The program elements are all force units and weapons systems whose
primary purpose is to provide “outputs” in support of this capability. Arraying units or
systems under the capability for which they primarily exist shows explicit connections
from policy objectives to the amounts budgeted for a specific unit or weapon to achieve
them. If the alternative designated to “Detain suspect” is army unit “x” that “Detains
suspect” as its primary purpose, the program structure might include:
(Major Program) 2. Stability Operations Forces (major program)
(Sub-Program) 2.1. Cessation of Hostilities (sub-program)
(Program Element) 2.1.1 Army “unit x”
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By arraying force units and weapons systems using a program structure, decision-
makers see complementary, substitutable, or stand-alone program elements and their
relationship to the budget. Using the program element as the basic building block of the
program structure also allows resource managers to generate budgets and information
relative to many managers’ needs.The database of program elements – such as military
policy units or aircraft “x” – contains the number of operational units, number of
personnel (military and civilian), and planned expenditures by procurement category
(military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, military construction,
research and development, etc.) for the complete force unit or weapons system to
operate.Thus, planners can compare alternative ways to provide a capability by various
budget expenditures, by personnel requirements, etc.
The main difficulty in implementing program budgets comes from having to list
units and systems in only one place in the program structure. Operationally, forces and
systems may support different missions, often supporting different capabilities. This
illustrates why public budgeting has never completely “solved” the problem of “What
do I get for what I spent?” Operationally, defense plans for and uses many force units or
weapons systems to meet more than one goal and in support of more than one capabil-
ity.19 For budgeting, resource planners must array forces and units so that they see total
amounts of money going to each, in one place.The capability of “Detain suspect” may
show up in capability areas other than stability operations.Trying to divide the budget
for a force unit or weapon system into multiple programs (or capabilities), however,
provides a level of complexity far beyond most organizations’ ability to track and
respond to funding requests.
Accordingly, the “rules” of a program structure dictate that a force unit or weapons
system shows up in only one place – under the major program where it serves its
primary purpose.This does not lessen the unit’s ability to provide capabilities in other
areas, nor does it stop organizations from “reimbursing” one another for using the same
force unit or weapons system for different purposes. It simply provides decision-makers
with a direct link from the ability to provide a major capability to the forces and units
needed to do so, and their associated funding requests.
A mapping from elemental capability in the master capability list to chosen alterna-
tive (force unit, system, etc.) in the program structure can be made as long as resource
planners and capability planners list every force unit or weapons system in the program
structure once and only once (mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive) into
groups of substitutes and complements.As was true with the PPBS system in the 1960s
and its evolution today, along with the experience of many countries and organizations,
the difficulty remains in identifying and agreeing upon the primary use of a force unit
or weapons system. This will be true, no matter what planning system and program
structure planners use. Nevertheless, aligning the program structure with major capa-
bility areas allows inter-program (loosely defined capability) tradeoffs, and within a
capability area, intra-capability tradeoffs (the outputs provided at the elemental capa-
bility level).
26.4 Master.qxp:D&SA  12/11/10  10:39  Page 396
GAP ANALYSIS
As stated above, the program structure can be useful for determining what capability
outputs exist within the current force structure. Because the program structure shows
a force unit or weapons system under only one program, it does not allow complete
analysis of capability gaps.Without it, however, planners and resource managers cannot
make comparisons of the costs and benefits of elemental capabilities and program
elements.
To determine where capabilities gaps exist, capability planners examine each
elemental capability against existing units and systems in the program structure and
determine whether existing forces can provide the desired capability.When the organi-
zation can provide the capability, planners should order or value each alternative force
unit or weapons system for comparison purposes. For example, one of three alternatives
– a military police unit, a special forces unit or a regular army unit – might provide the
capability “Detain suspect”. Planners determine the number of existing military police
units, special forces units and army units with respect to the elemental capability
“Detain subject”, then determine how to value them relative to one another. Suppose
planners assess military police units as the best way to provide the elemental capability,
and assign them a score of ten out of ten. Suppose they also assign special forces units a
score of seven out of ten and regular army units at six out of ten. Using this valuation
and the number of units/forces available determines the amount of existing capability.
Planners must take special care to account for concurrency and exclusivity of forces
since one alternative (such as a regular army unit) can provide multiple elemental capa-
bilities.
Once planners know concurrent needs for each elemental capability, they estimate
gaps across all elemental capabilities. The gaps where too few or no force unit or
weapons system provides the elemental capability become apparent. In addition,
planners may find existing forces not needed to provide any elemental capability.These
would be candidates for retirement, potentially freeing additional funds to help
eliminate the gaps.
After identifying gaps, planners prioritize the capability gaps. To do this, planners
first need to determine the relative importance of each elemental capability. Planners
determine relative importance based on some combination of: in how many scenarios
a capability is used and how many times it is used in each scenario. Sometimes,
however, planners deem a capability critical if it alone determines the success of a
mission in a particular scenario.While a mathematical approach may provide an initial
estimate of relative importance, planners ultimately rank elemental capabilities subjec-
tively.
Once planners have a sense of each capability’s relative importance, they can assess
the risks posed by the gaps.This generally involves evaluating the relative importance
(in terms of risk) of each scenario and the importance of each elemental capability.
Figure 3 illustrates an example of the product of such an analysis. It shows a simplified
version of one of the ways planners aggregate and determine where they have capabil-
ity and where they do not. The figure shows capabilities by number, then
sub-capabilities by number, then ratings of the organization’s ability to provide the
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sub-capability using colors (green = high ability; blue = reasonable ability; yellow =
some ability; red = no ability, for example).
Figure 3: Capabilities, Sub-Capabilities and Ratings of Ability to Provide
Sub-Capabilities
After prioritizing desired capabilities, strategic planners, capability planners and
resource managers consider alternative ways to fill the gaps. There may be many
different ways to eliminate the gaps without resorting to major weapons platform
purchases, such as changes in doctrine, organizational structure, training, systems
(materiel systems, armaments), support (stocks and sustainment), personnel and infra-
structure. The scenario dimensions above can help facilitate development of
alternatives since they highlight all the important facets that contribute to a scenario’s
risk.The analysis of alternative ways to eliminate gaps should include cost-effectiveness
and cost–risk concepts and the ability to trade-off one alternative for another. Maintain-
ing the ability to make trade-offs means that planners should not have over-specified
elemental capabilities. If planners define an elemental capability so that only one alter-
native can address it (e.g., defining an elemental capability so that only a Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle with two Hellfire missiles can fulfill it) then they negate the
purpose and spirit of CBP.
Last, planners evaluate new systems and new approaches on their contribution to all
capability categories.The remaining problem, not addressed in this paper, is a portfolio
analysis. Planners must determine the combination of alternatives that produces the
greatest increase in capabilities in the most important capability gaps while remaining
within the budget. The final steps include positioning the new capabilities within the
program structure, developing an acquisition strategy, and ensuring all necessary costs
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CONCLUSION
This article explores one of the greatest difficulties in defense planning and resourcing:
bridging the divide between planners who develop a joint strategy for the current and
future capabilities of the armed forces and the budgeters who must translate this plan
into inputs purchased.To avoid misalignment between planned capabilities and budget
systems resulting in the inability to connect plans to resources, the authors provide one
method for mapping plans to resources using program budgets and the framework of a
program structure.The authors describe how to support the choices of decision-makers
from desired capabilities through to budgets and back, emphasizing systems thinking.
Future analysis might include an examination of and summary of lessons learned
from countries and organizations that have met with at least limited success in imple-
menting a planning-to-resourcing system. Research extending agency theory might
help organizations better implement such a system. Since measures of cost and perfor-
mance (output) do not always provide sub-organizations within defense (or the
government agency) incentives aligned with goals and objectives of the MoD or DoD,
sub-organizations may engage in activities that the MoD or DoD, if they had the sub-
organization’s information, would consider suboptimal.20 Additionally, researchers
might examine, among other topics, the impacts of 1) scenario risk analysis, particularly
in an alliance setting (where different countries provide different capabilities and no
central budget funds the joint (alliance) capabilities; 2) cost and cost-effectiveness
analysis; and 3) risk on resource allocation in an alliance setting to increase the under-
standing of how planning based on capabilities can better link to resource management
decisions.
NOTES
1. A. H. Lange (N. J.Webb and A. Richter, interviewers), 1 February 2009.
2. US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review,Washington DC: US Department
of Defense, 2010, p. iii.
3. M. Fitzsimmons, “Whither Capabilities-based Planning?”, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 44,
2007, pp. 101–105.
4. Italics added by the authors for emphasis.
5. Ibid.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff,Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 2005.
7. The authors do not attempt to prescribe steps for carrying CBP through the execution
process.
8. For more on these benefits, see op. cit., also, P. Davis (MR-1513-OSD), Analytic Architecture
for Capabilties-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation,Washington DC:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense, 2002.
9. J. M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, pp. 123, 204.
10. For another example of how to identify strategic issues, Casey and Peck use Whole Goals®
and Force Field Analysis with defense and other organizations. http://elg.net/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5&Itemid=5&28e5bbf660cb545fc854f5c048
c7be7c=54526e30ccc035811d7a014361103390 (This is the reference to their publications
and information).
11. Ibid.,p. 125.
LINKING DEFENSE PLANNING AND RESOURCE DECISIONS • 399
26.4 Master.qxp:D&SA  12/11/10  10:39  Page 399
12. The authors use the term “planners” rather loosely in this article, combining strategic
planners with capability developers or planners. In either case, they mean the people respon-
sible for connecting strategic goals and objectives to capabilities or desired outcomes for
defense or national security.
13. N. N.Taleb, The Black Swan, Random House, 2007.
14. “Capability-Based Long Term Planning”, RTO-MP-SAS-072, NATO Research and Tech-
nology Organisation, November 2008.
15. D. Novick, “Decision Making in the Department of Defense”, Business Horizons, 1972,
pp. 23–33. Also A. Schick, “The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform”, Public
Administration Review, 1966, pp. 243–258.
16. C. Bourdeaux, “The Problem with Programs: Multiple Perspectives on Program Structures
in Program-based Performance-oriented Budgets”, Public Budgeting & Finance, 2008, p. 20.
17. Bourdeaux, “The problem with programs”, op. cit.,
18. Ibid.; B. Holmstrom and P. Milgrom, “Multitask Principal-agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
1991.
19. It is important to remember that the program structure functions to better facilitate tradeoffs
among strategic goals and resources, not to suggest how military units are organized or how
they function.
20. See B. Holmstrom and P. Milgrom, “Multitask principal-agent analyses”, op. cit., for an
analysis of multi-task principal agent incentives and contracts. R. Wintrobe, “Modern
BureaucraticTheory”, Perspectives on Public Choice, 1997, reviews the literature on bargaining
games between government agencies and their sponsors, while C. Prendergast, “The
Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Journal of Economic Literature, 1999, pp. 7–63, reviews the
literature on the provision of incentives in firms.
400 • NATALIE J. WEBB, ANKE RICHTER AND DONALD BONSPER
26.4 Master.qxp:D&SA  12/11/10  10:39  Page 400
